



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

JAPAN'S ANNEXATION OF KOREA

*By Toyokichi Iyenaga, Ph.D., Professorial Lecturer in
Political Science, University of Chicago*

Japan was prompted to take the decisive step of annexing Korea for reasons that are easily understood. They are: (1) to insure her own national safety; (2) to assure enduring peace in the Far East by eliminating one of the most fruitful sources of disturbance; (3) to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Koreans; (4) to do away with the disadvantages, administrative and financial, of a dual system of government—the residency general and the Korean government; (5) to consolidate the identical interests of Japan and Korea in the Far East by the amalgamation of two peoples whose similarity in race and past culture makes such a task possible.

From the strategic standpoint, Korea is to the Japanese Empire as a spear pointed at its heart. Whatever nation holds this weapon becomes supremely important to Japan. Korea, even in the days of junks, if in the possession of a powerful monarch, must of necessity have been a constant menace to the safety of Nippon; but in this age of steam, when the Korean Strait has been transformed into a mere ribbon of silver, the installment of a strong hostile power in the peninsula would prove the death-blow to the aspirations, if not the very existence, of the mikado's empire. No question, therefore, has exercised a more powerful influence upon the course of the New Japan than this Korean problem.

The history of the Japanese-Korean relations during the three decades that intervene between the conclusion of the first treaty of amity and commerce in 1876 and the establishment of a protectorate in 1907 is in reality the story of Japan's attempt to safeguard her security by the maintenance of Korea as a buffer state. The first trial Japan faced to test the strength of this political doctrine came naturally

from China, which has always striven to lay a shadowy claim of sovereignty over Korea. The China-Japan war of 1894-1895 resulted in the complete political effacement of China from Korea, and the definite recognition of Korean independence by the powers. Thus for a time the buffer state theory seemed vindicated. China ousted, however, Japan found herself confronted in Korea by another formidable power. The struggle of 1904-1905, undertaken at an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, finally drove Russia out of Korea, and at the same time fully convinced Japan of the futility of an attempt to seek her salvation by dreams made of such stuffs as those of a strong Korean nationality. Through these two costly experiments Japan learned that something decisive must be done with this country, which, while its interests and destiny are so closely allied with those of Japan, cannot maintain its own independence.

So, after the Portsmouth and the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1905 had definitely recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea, the first task Japan undertook to accomplish was to eliminate from Korea the danger of any foreign complications that might again invite foreign intervention. By the agreement signed in November, 1905, the Japanese government took into its hands the management of Korean foreign affairs.

After this important step was taken, Japan began in good earnest to put the Korean house in order. For this purpose it was agreed that a resident general, representing the Japanese government, should reside at Seoul. At first his power was purely advisory. But it was soon found that the optional method was doomed to failure, for the Korean government, free to adopt or reject at will the advice of the resident general, usually chose the latter alternative, and as a consequence by the agreement of 1907 the power of the resident general was vastly increased. He was given the power to initiate as well as to direct measures of administration, to enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and dismiss high Korean officials, and to appoint to any public posts, except to the ministerial seats in the Cabinet,

any Japanese subjects of his choice. Korea, in short, was brought under the protectorate of Japan.

The importance Japan attached to the work of pacifying and regenerating Korea is shown by the fact that she sent as the first resident general her foremost statesman, Prince Ito. With sincere devotion to the cause of Korea, he brought to the task all the wisdom, experience, and prestige gained during his long service to his fatherland. After three years of arduous labor he succeeded in conciliating the court and silencing the opposition, in evolving some order out of chaos, and inaugurating many reforms the benefits of which have been lasting.

But even the statesmanship of Ito was not equal to the task of curing the cancer that had eaten deep into the heart of Korea. The surgical operation needed was left to Prince Katsura, the former premier. Throughout his administration, Prince Ito had hoped by pursuing the policy of conciliation and uplift, to make Korea capable of standing on its own feet. He was, however, forced to acknowledge, after the most sincere efforts to teach Koreans the science of statecraft, that they would never be able to govern themselves. The first public intimation of this conviction was made in April, 1909, when Prince Ito, speaking before Korean tourists said that Japan and Korea had hitherto stood side by side, but that they should now proceed together and form one empire.

Some publicists have asserted that the tragic death of Ito at Harbin sealed the fate of Korea. Nothing is further from the truth. That Prince Ito retired from the residency generalship some months before his assassination without any apparent valid cause, goes to show that he had already become convinced that annexation was inevitable, and that the performance of it would better be confided to another. In an interview with the writer, Prince Katsura assured him that the measure of annexation was decided upon after due conference with Prince Ito, and only after it had received his complete endorsement. This declaration is further emphasized by the fact that the first act of Count Terauchi, after signing the treaty of annexation, was to send from

Seoul a telegraphic message to the family of the late prince requesting them to convey the intelligence to the spirit of the deceased statesman. The suggestion was carried out on August 30, 1910, when Prince Hirokuni Ito, as the representative of the family, conducted a solemn ceremonial service at the tomb of the illustrious dead.

Such, then, is the short story of the successive steps leading to the annexation. The lessons of history, extending through three eventful decades, taught Japan most conclusively that nothing short of annexation could solve the Korean problem, and that only by this radical measure could the permanent security of Japan and the peace of the extreme East be assured. The imperial rescript proclaiming the annexation, therefore, begins with the declaration that the emperor, "attaching the highest importance to the maintenance of permanent peace in the Orient and the consolidation of lasting security to our empire and finding in Korea constant and fruitful sources of complication," had instituted a protectorate in the peninsula. The existing régime, however, having proved ineffective to preserve peace and stability, "it has become manifest that fundamental changes in the present system of government are inevitable."

Imperative as was the measure of annexation from the standpoint of Japan's self-preservation, still more urgent was its adoption from the consideration of putting an end to the spirit of unrest in Korea and advancing its true welfare. Since the establishment of the residency general, every effort has been made to eradicate the existing evils, and to promote the well-being and prosperity of the Koreans. The residency general can, indeed, present to us a formidable array of reform works undertaken under its auspices. A brief outline of these reforms is here needed, in order to give us a full realization of the points wherein the protectorate, in spite of its commendable efforts to introduce salutary reforms, has failed to bring peace and happiness to the Korean people.

PURIFICATION OF THE COURT AND FINANCIAL REFORM

Among the many ills afflicting Korea, no one was more baneful than the court, the hotbed of corruption and intrigue. The functions and properties of the court were hopelessly mixed with those of the state. Laws were enacted, and justice administered, often at the whim of the king or of his courtiers. Appointments of high officials were frequently made through the influence of court favorites. Sales of offices were openly advertised at the court, and, needless to say, the appointment went to that highest bidder, who knew best how to fill the royal coffers and then to reimburse himself with the squeezes exacted from the people. Bribes and the confiscation of private property for the benefit of court officials were common.

Almost as influential as the imperial household itself were its bureaus and offices which outnumbered those of the central government. These superfluous offices were filled with thousands of worthless officers, whose chief occupation was, when not engaged in hatching plots, to attend absurd state ceremonials and harmful religious rites. For these religious services there were employed, and often domiciled in the court, a crowd of soothsayers, geomancers, sorceresses, and others of their ilk, who through densest ignorance and unbridled vices added their deadly quota to the pollution of the court. To this long list of evildoers were further added unscrupulous foreign adventurers, who frequented the court, and busied themselves in devising grotesque schemes to defraud the royal treasury of its funds. What was its actual condition can best be imagined by the items of expenditure of the Imperial Household, given in the first report of the Japanese financial adviser, Baron Megata. Out of the total expenditure of 2,923,000 yen, the largest sum, 905,000 yen, is the item of expense for religious observances; the sums of 432,000 yen and 220,000 yen are respectively for food and the banquets of courtiers, while but a paltry 25,000 yen is for the use of the imperial family.

Out of confusion between the functions and properties of the state and those of the crown had resulted the chaos

in the public finance. Many of the legitimate functions of the finance department of the Korean government had been usurped by the financial board of the imperial household, in control of court upstarts. Owing to the lack of organized method of tax collection, the court and the government each sent out its own agents to collect taxes and levy compulsory contributions upon the people. The people were ground between the two millstones, the court and the government.

To make the confusion worse confounded, the currency system was in the most wretched state. The Korean metallic currency consisted of silver coins, a nickel coin of 5 sen and a 1 sen copper cash, the last two being most widely circulated. The court caring mainly for the profit derived from minting nickels coined the debased nickel coin to such an amount that its market value fell to one-half its face value. On the other hand, the copper cash, whose face value represented its actual value, often fluctuated from 100 per cent to 60 per cent premium. To cap all, the revenue derived by the state from its people of over 12,000,000 was only 7,480,287 yen for 1905.

To make a clean sweep of the court and to rescue the finances of the country from certain ruin, were, therefore, the prime necessities of reform. In spite of the persistent opposition and bickerings of the court officials, the delicate task of cleansing the imperial household was finally accomplished by the resident general. He "separated it effectually from the executive; differentiated its property from that of the state; purged it of a rabble of sorcerers, necromancers, and other scheming parasites; dismissed a host of useless officials; abolished many costly and worthless ceremonials—792 annually were reduced to 201, while 2900 employees were dispensed with; repaired the palace; replaced the old-fashioned sedan chairs with modern carriages and the ancient oil lamps with electric light; established a museum, botanical and zoölogical gardens, and a library; and finally, reorganized the household, and placed upon its staff several competent Japanese officials."

Meanwhile Megata and his worthy successors under the residency general worked hard for financial rehabilitation. They adjusted the state and crown properties by bringing under the control of the finance department the collection of all taxes and by transferring into the possession of the state all immovable properties belonging to the crown. In lieu of these transfers the State became responsible for the liquidation of the debts hitherto contracted by the imperial household, as well as for its future maintenance. The financial administrators further resuscitated and vigorously put in force the budget system; instituted the national treasury, and finally established the gold standard by withdrawing the old nickel coins and copper cash, and substituting them by the new sound currency. Whereas in former days pawnbrokers, innkeepers and the like carried on the most primitive kind of banking business, the residency general called into being various banks. Whereas formerly the Korean government had little or no credit to float state bonds, the residency general helped it to raise many public loans, the most important of which is that of 20,000,000 for the undertaking of various public works. By these salutary measures the revenue of the Korean Treasury has doubled itself within half a decade, and a brighter era has dawned upon the financial world of Korea.

REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND PRISONS

In Korea the judiciary and the executive were formerly not separated. Provincial governors, prefects, and district magistrates discharged judicial functions in their executive capacity. Under such a system there was no limit to the evil done. "Civil cases were usually determined in favor of the longest purse, and criminal ones depended on the arbitrary will of a tyro sitting in judgment; a witness generally ranked as *particeps criminis*, and evidence was usually extorted by torture." Floggings were often so severely administered as to render the victim a cripple for life, if he did not die under the infliction. Innocent persons

were often thrown into jails by the executive, either to extort money or to wreak personal vengeance. Prisons attached to governor's yamen were shocking dungeons. In winter the prisoners were sometimes frozen to death, and in summer fell victims to suffocation or epidemic diseases.

All these abuses have been thoroughly reformed. Several well administered prisons have been opened, where sanitary measures are rigorously enforced; special rooms set apart for female prisoners and the sick; religious teaching given by Christian and Buddhist teachers; and out-door work introduced to give air and exercise to prisoners. The judiciary is now independent of the executive. Torture has been abolished; Koreans have been trained to serve as barristers; a penal code has been framed; temporary regulations for civil and criminal procedure enacted, which are soon to be replaced by a civil code and a code of civil and criminal procedure; and finally the rights of an individual to enjoy his life and property fully guaranteed.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Until recently Korea had no regular system of public education. The institutions in existence were of the most primitive order. In a village there was a *Clu-pung*, where the village dominie gathered about him the children of the neighborhood and taught them the rudiments of reading and writing. In each district there was the *Han-gio*, maintained by government patronage or donations of private individuals, where were received the students of *Clu-pung* desirous for more advanced study of Chinese. And finally, as the highest seat of Confucian learning, there was in Seoul the *Syong-Kyūn-Koan*, where instruction was given in Chinese classics. The method of teaching in vogue in these so-called schools was patterned after that of China, and, while this was bad, the Korean was still worse. This is not surprising since the pedagogical profession had fallen into hopeless disrepute. "The traditional Korean school-teacher," says an eye witness, "is looked upon as more or less of a mendicant. Only the poorest will engage in this work,

and they do it on a pittance, which just keeps them above the starvation line." Modern education in scientific and useful subjects was an unknown thing in most parts of the country. The only beam of light that pierced the Korean night came from the lamp burning in the missionary schools.

The work of the residency general was thus nothing less than the creation of an entirely new system of public education. The educational authorities wisely planned not to destroy at one stroke the old educational structures but to utilize them as far as possible, and replace them gradually by something better, and to establish the modern schools which will serve as models to Koreans, hoping that they will come to build such schools of their own accord. The system of education inaugurated was somewhat the same as that adopted in Japan, with modifications adapted to the degree of intelligence and conditions prevailing in Korea. There are thus public common schools, high schools, and normal and technical schools. There were at the time of the annexation 60 common schools, 9 high schools, 1 normal school, 1 foreign language school, 1 medical school, 1 commercial school, 1 industrial training school, and 1 agricultural and forestry school.

The slowness of the educational pace was due to the lack of money, the scarcity of native teachers, as well as to the peculiar educational difficulty Japan had to face.

NATURAL RESOURCES OF KOREA AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT

While the financial, judicial, and educational reforms were thus vigorously pushed, the cause of material development was no less sedulously cared for. To facilitate transportation, 640 miles of railroads have been constructed; 7682 miles of telegraph, and 7931 miles of telephone wires laid; highways repaired or constructed; posts and parcel posts organized; and steamship lines opened.

The natural resources of Korea are not so limited as its present extreme poverty might imply. Gold, lead, iron, copper, and coal are found in the northern mountains. But

except the gold mines worked by Americans at Unsan, and a few coal mines at Pying-Yang and other localities, the subsoil is almost left unexploited. Manufacturing industry can hardly be said to exist. The Korean waters helped by the Black Current, teem with fish, and with the extensive sea coast, they are ideal fisheries. But the fishing method is so primitive that the annual catch by Koreans amounts to only 3,000,000 yen. The chief wealth of Korea lies at present in its agricultural products. Rice, barley, wheat, and beans are the principal products. Their total annual crop is about 14,000,000 *koku* (approximately 70,000,000 bushels) which at rough estimate is worth 110,000,000 yen. By improvement in agriculture this annual crop can be vastly increased, perhaps doubled. Further, incredible as it may seem, the indolence and stupidity of Koreans have left nine-tenths of their country as waste land or denuded mountains. Sixty-six per cent of the country's cultivable area lies fallow!

The residency general, therefore, bent its energy to improve agricultural methods, encourage industry, and develop other natural resources. It helped to organize the Oriental Development Company, whose business is to reclaim waste lands, to accommodate farmers with lands, seeds, implements, and shelters, and to engage in other undertakings deemed necessary for the development of the country. The residency general has also established a horticultural station, nursery gardens, irrigation reservoirs, and a model farm at Suwon, with four branches at Mokpo, Kunsan, Pying-Yang and Taiku. The director of the Suwon Station, Dr. Honda, told the writer that by agricultural improvements it will not be difficult to increase the present crop of cereals in Korea by 40 per cent.

No less commendable is the work of afforestation. No feature of Korea strikes its first visitor more than the ugly barrenness of its hills and mountains. This is, however, due not to the niggardliness of Nature, but to the reckless felling of trees by the people for fuel, and to despotism. It is said that when Tai-Won-Kun built his costly palace at Seoul, the people, in order to escape the forced contribu-

tions for tall trees, and for labor to convey them to the capital, cut them down and burned them. This deforestation of mountains is a principal cause of injury to agriculture. To mend this, model forests have been established where are planted millions of young trees imported from Japan, and every effort is made to afforest the bare mountains throughout the country.

How the reform work inaugurated by Japan stimulated the activity of Korea in various spheres of its life is plainly shown by the phenomenal growth of its commerce. The total of its foreign trade in 1903, the year before Japan's intervention, barely reached the mark of 28,000,000 yen, while the figures for 1910 stood at 59,500,000—an increase of 106 per cent within less than a decade.

RESULTS OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISE

The results of Japanese enterprise under the régime of protectorate in Korea above sketched, are summed up by Captain Brinkley, editor of the *Japan Mail*, in these words:

In less than a decade Japan has served up for her neighbor's nourishment all the fruits of her own activities during a cycle of unprecedentedly crowded life. . . . In their cities Koreans no longer live in perpetual contact with accumulated filth. In their passage from place to place they have ceased to rely solely on sedan chairs and ponies, as railways and electric trains have become available. In agriculture they have model farms to guide them, and the most fruitful seeds are at their disposal. In the hour of sickness they command expert medical aid or facile access to well-equipped hospitals. In their chief towns they drink pure water from modern aqueducts instead of the contents of contaminated wells. In educating their children they have the use of schools where the most serviceable branches of modern knowledge are taught. When they are wronged they can count on justice instead of extortion, and in their daily existence they are beginning to know the blessings of security of life and property.

FUNDAMENTAL REMEDY LACKING IN THE RÉGIME OF PROTECTORATE—ITS DRAWBACKS

Why did this enterprise bring no commensurate blessing upon Koreans? Why have they turned their backs upon all these gifts? Why was Japan forced to confess after the

trial of three years, that she failed to find in the régime of a protectorate sufficient hope for the realization of her object, and that the "condition of unrest and disquietude still prevails throughout the whole peninsula?" In spite of the utmost efforts which Japan exerted to cure the Korean patient, there was one fundamental remedy lacking under the old prescription. The patient's mind was ill at ease. Medicines and nutritious food produced little effect until the peace of his spirit was restored. Koreans had always looked with suspicion upon the doings of Japan. Their ideas of loyalty and patriotism could find no reconciliation with that of submission to Japan. Insurgency was, therefore, often looked upon as the act of devotion to the Korean emperor. The murderer of Prince Ito and the would-be assassin of Premier Yi were hailed in some quarters as heroes. These criminal ideas were further utilized by a host of thieves who infested the land, and now comfortably adopted the dual profession of insurgent and brigand. To cut down these robbers and stamp out the insurrection, Japan was forced to organize a large body of police and *gendarmérie*, in addition to the garrison army of a division and a half. During four years these forces have shot over 14,000 of these insurgents, which naturally accentuated the bitter feelings of Koreans toward Japanese. And yet the insurgency was far from being wiped out.

The régime of protectorate thus not only failed to bring peace to Korea, but carried with it certain drawbacks that tied down the hands of Japanese administrators. The following is a single instance. One of the serious difficulties Japan met in solving the Korean educational problem was how to adapt and apply its fundamental principle of education in Korea. Japan's cardinal ethic of a good citizenship is loyalty and patriotism. It is inculcated in the minds of her sons and daughters, from the students of common schools to those of universities. Taught to the Korean youths, this moral weapon becomes two-edged. Misapplied, it is suicidal to Japan. The Japanese educators in Korea were, therefore, extremely solicitous to impart to the Korean children the correct understanding of this moral teaching. They them-

selves compiled most of the text-books for schools, and prohibited the use of other books than those that had passed their rigid inspection. It is, however, difficult to see how such a temporary makeshift could succeed in preventing Koreans from their ultimate disillusionment. For so long as Korea retained its own king and semi-independence, it is but natural and logical that Koreans should devote their loyalty and patriotism to their own emperor and country. And who could blame them for that? The more Koreans were imbued with the spirit of loyalty and patriotism, the more they were fired with the zeal to liberate their country from the grasp of Japan, however utopian that might be. Such misguided youths either swelled the ranks of insurgents or turned assassins of ministers of state. The moral lesson taught by Japan was, therefore, in a sense, equivalent to adding fuel to the fire of insurgency. The difficulty of ruling Korea under the régime of a protectorate was, in essence, the same as Americans, who preach at home the doctrine of independence and state rights, experienced in ruling the Philippines, until to the Filipinos were given some measure of self-government and a hope of entire independence. In the case of Korea, the only exit from the dilemma was found in the measure, whereby Korea becomes an integral part of the Japanese Empire, and Koreans the loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE DUAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Beside the fundamental drawback in the régime of protectorate above stated, there were other disadvantages that are more or less inherent in a dual system of government. These were administrative and financial. It might be imagined that the various reform works hitherto undertaken for the good of Korea were wholly at the expense of the Korean government. Far from it. The burden of defraying the cost of most of these reforms had been shouldered by the Japanese treasury. Such were the cost of initiating and completing the judicial and prison reforms, of establishing educational institutions, of sustaining the army and *gen-*

darmerie for the maintenance of peace and order, of constructing and running the organs of communications—railroads, telegraphs, telephones—of maintaining the residency general, and of undertaking various public works. For the latter purpose the Japanese government lent to the Korean government over 14,000,000 yen free of interest and without fixed period of redemption. All these imposed on the Japanese treasury an average annual outlay of 28,000,000 yen for the period of five years—1906–1910—making the total of 143,016,057 yen. This does not include the cost of building the railroad for which Japan spent another 90,000,000 yen. This financial burden had to be borne by the Japanese government without complete financial control over the Korean exchequer.

Further, there was an administrative disadvantage in the régime of a protectorate. Without dilating upon the details, it suffices us to say that the protectorate, consisting of the residency general and the Korean government, was a cumbersome governmental machinery. Each had its own department and bureaus; each its own staff of officials and employees. That such a complex machinery lacked smooth working even under the leadership of Ito is too well proved by the frequent changes made in the organization of its parts. It is then but proper that a way was sought to mend this lack of harmony in administrative organization at the first opportunity. That way was found in the simple and unified organization of the government general, which resembles in main the government of Formosa under Japanese rule.

PEACEFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ANNEXATION AND THE METHOD ADOPTED

Count Terauchi has accomplished with consummate tact the work of annexation. To carry out the program there were two ways which naturally suggested themselves. One was by the exercise of sovereign power on the part of the Japanese emperor, which however, implied the use of

force. The other was by an agreement with Korea, with the full consent of the Korean emperor and government. It was obvious that the second method of procedure was decidedly preferable, and, as a consequence, the Japanese government, after formulating its policy in July, 1909, for the eventual annexation of Korea, waited only for an opportune time for its prosecution. In May, 1910, the government directed the resident general, Count Terauchi, who had succeeded Viscount Sone, to proceed to his post. He was in receipt of the necessary instructions authorizing him to arrange for the annexation. Early in August the count opened the discussion of the subject with the Korean government. Several other conferences followed, and the final phase of the negotiation is told by Count Terauchi himself in a document which he courteously sent me, and which, having a historical interest, is produced here:

The Korean Court and the Government, assured of the wisdom of our Emperor and of the liberal attitude of His Majesty's Government, came to repose implicit confidence in us, so that during the negotiations all our proposals were accepted save only those dealing with the new name of the Peninsula and future title of the Imperial Family. We proposed that its members should bear the title of Taiko (Grand Duke), but the Korean authorities demanded for them the title of Wang (Prince), and that the name of the Peninsula should be Chosen. These conditions were agreed to. In all other respects the negotiations were very smoothly conducted. A final meeting of the Korean authorities was held in the presence of the Korean Emperor, attended by all the members of the Cabinet, together with Prince Yi-Keui, the uncle of the Emperor, representing the Imperial Family, Kim-in-Sik, President of the Central Council, representing the Elder Statesmen, the Minister of the Imperial Household, Lord Chamberlain, Chief of the Body Guard, and Chief of the Emperor's aides-de-camp. At this meeting the Emperor dwelt on the amicable relation existing between Korea and Japan, and explained the advisability of amalgamating both nations in order to place their mutual benefit and welfare on a permanent basis. This was followed by the reading of His Majesty's proclamation, and the investment of the Prime Minister, Yi Wang Yong, with full power to conclude the treaty of annexation. Thus authorized, the Premier produced the draft of the treaty for imperial inspection. He explained its provisions clause by clause, and upon obtaining the imperial sanction to it repaired to the office of the Resident-

General. The Premier assured me that everything was prepared, and nothing was left undone which was considered necessary for the execution of the compact. The treaty was then signed by him and by me."

The annexation treaty was signed on the afternoon of August 22, 1910, and promulgated on the 29th of the same month. By the treaty the Korean emperor ceded all rights of sovereignty over Korea to the emperor of Japan. Korea is now re-christened Chosen, the ancient title of the peninsula. The security and dignity of the Korean imperial house are sustained by the guarantee of the Japanese government for its perpetual maintenance, with the generous annual allowance of 1,500,000 yen. Japan thus fulfills her pledge to maintain the safety and dignity of the Korean imperial house made in the convention of November 17, 1906, which replaced and superseded the agreement of July 23, 1905, in which it was stipulated that Japan would guarantee the independence and integrity of Korea. The last promise was not given in the convention of 1906. The Korean emperor now becomes Prince Li Wang. Upon the other members of the imperial family the appropriate titles are also given, with grants of sufficient allowances. Seventy-two peers of Chosen have been created to reward the elder statesmen, cabinet members, and others who have rendered meritorious services to the state, with generous gifts of money ranging from 25,000 yen to 100,000 yen. For this purpose, and to give employment to the destitute of the Yang-ban class, the sum of 13,000,000 yen was allotted. The membership of the central council, composed exclusively of Koreans, was also increased, so as to admit many statesmen who can reasonably claim a voice in Korean affairs. Local councils have been organized in various provinces for the purpose of consulting the Koreans themselves about the management of their own affairs.

In order to relieve the suffering of the people, and that they may appreciate the blessings of the new régime, the land taxes in arrears have been remitted, and the land tax for the year 1910 reduced by one-fifth of the rate. In addition, the sum of 17,398,000 yen was distributed among the

people, portioned out to 12 municipalities and 317 rural districts.

The object of this grant was to instruct Koreans in the means of livelihood, to promote education, and to provide against bad crops and natural calamities. For the first mentioned purpose there were established altogether 35 sericultural training houses, 21 training houses for weaving, 13 common sericultural workshops, 8 training houses for paper making, 3 fishery training houses, 37 seedling nurseries, 4 mulberry farms, 8 common industrial workshops, and 4 industrial training houses. Resident and travelling instructors for these institutions numbered some 150 in July, 1911. In the line of education 133 public primary schools and 7 industrial apprentice schools (a phenomenal increase from the time of the Residency-General) had been founded while a decision had been made that a grant-in-aid should be given to 217 various public and private schools.

Charity hospitals and their branches have been established in the chief towns and cities. An amnesty to prisoners and criminals deserving commiseration was granted, the number pardoned being 1711. At the same time 12,155 aged members of the Korean aristocracy and literati were granted imperial gifts, while 3209 filial sons and faithful wives were rewarded with suitable gifts as models to the people for filial piety and faithfulness.

Religious freedom has been proclaimed. It is well worth adding here that the attitude of the government general of Chosen toward Christian missionaries and native converts has not undergone any change since the time of Prince Ito. That attitude is announced by the present governor-general in these words:

It is beyond the sphere of administrative authority to interfere with the liberty of conscience. Confucianism, Buddhism, or Christianity, so far as they aim at the betterment of mankind, and the improvement of the mental and spiritual condition of the people, not only stand in no opposition to the administration of the country, but are calculated to aid in the good purposes of a government. For this reason my attitude toward any form of religious faith is impartial and without any prejudice. It is, however, absolutely necessary to separate the religious question from the civic, and I cannot permit any form of political interference under the guise of a religion.

This sane but firm attitude of the present governor general is intelligible to those who are familiar with the conditions

under the old régime of native converts, some of whom flocked to the standard of Christianity with the sole object of accomplishing their political aim, and so constituted an element of disturbance of civic order and peace. At the same time we can readily understand the solicitude of the government general that its position on the missionary question be fully appreciated by the missionary body, which forms not only the most powerful foreign element for good but the majority of the foreigners residing in Korea. Out of 800 foreign residents 500 are missionaries and their families. Coöperation, not antagonism, seems, then, to be the right principle of action to be adopted by both parties—the missionary and the government general. It will certainly be conducive to the good of Korea for each party to restrict its activity to its proper domain. Happily this seems to be the present-day working basis of the most influential portions of the missionary body.

With regard to the management of the external affairs of Korea, Japan declared at the time of annexation the rules to be followed by her. These rules, in substance, pledged the extension to Korea of Japan's existing treaties as far as possible; granted all privileges that are accorded to foreign residents in Japan proper; and guaranteed protection under Japanese jurisdiction of all legally acquired rights of the foreign residents in Korea. It is but logical that, since the treaties of Japan with foreign Powers have become operative in Chosen, the right of extra-territoriality hitherto enjoyed by foreigners in Chosen should cease to have force. Foreigners, as a matter of fact, are no losers by the abolition of the consular jurisdiction for, not only do they now enjoy the privilege of travelling, residing, and trading in any part of Korea, but they are relieved from certain disadvantages inherent in the old régime, as, for instance, in appellate cases the necessity of travelling to Shanghai for Anglo-Americans, and to Saigon for Frenchmen. And the standard of the administration of justice in Chosen will not fall behind that ruling in Japan proper. That the Japanese government has met the foreign governments with a very liberal spirit is shown by the fact that, in order to prevent

financial and economic disturbance, the old customs tariff is to be retained for a period of ten years, and further by the concession the Japanese government has made to the foreign owners of lands or mines in Korea in not subjecting them to the conditions and restrictions of the foreign land ownership law or of the mining law at present in force in Japan.

PRESENT POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF
CHOSŌN

It now only remains for us to see the policy pursued at the present time by the government general of Chosen, for upon it rests the happiness of the new subjects of the mikado. "The fundamental policy of the government," said the present governor general at a gubernatorial meeting held at Tokyo on April 15, 1911, "is to give the people of Chosen the means of livelihood, to ensure the security of their lives and property, and to enable them to enjoy the blessing of an enlightened age." "The essential point," he further emphasized, "is that through eradication of the distinction between Japanese and Koreans the weal of the greater nation will be promoted, and the foundation of the State be even more solidified." Were Koreans as different from Japanese in race and past civilization as Filipinos are in these respects from their American rulers, or Egyptians and Hindus from the English, annexation might still have taken place, but not certainly in the spirit that actuates both Japanese Government and people. What is aimed at is complete amalgamation, so that "the two peoples whose countries are in close proximity, whose interests are identical, and who are bound together with brotherly feelings, should amalgamate and form one body." Whatever may be the ethnological origin of Koreans and Japanese, it is a plain fact that the intermingling of blood has produced such similar types of the human species in both lands that one often finds it difficult to discover any distinction between the two, when the conventionalities of dress and coiffure are made the same. Though language is dissimilar, the literature is not so. Chinese literature is our common

heritage, and with it came our common ancient civilization. This identity of race, literature and past culture, between Koreans and Japanese, places the annexation of Korea in an entirely different category from that of Madagascar by France, or Hawaii by the United States. The great stress is, therefore, laid to obliterate the distinction between the two peoples, and to make the Koreans as good and loyal subjects of the emperor as the Japanese themselves. The newly created Korean nobles are accorded the same treatment at the Tokyo court as their Japanese confrères. Koreans who have received sufficient education are employed in the civil as well as in the military services. Unruly Japanese are strictly enjoined to behave well toward their common nationals.

Nor are the Koreans slow to respond to this call to brotherly union. On the occasion of the emperor's birthday, his new subjects shout "banzai" as lustily as their brethren across the sea. But no better proof of the good feeling of the Koreans toward their new rulers can be afforded than the increase in the amount of taxes paid, and the expedition with which they were collected. In spite of the remission of taxes in arrears and a 5 per cent reduction of the land tax for the financial year of 1910-1911, the state revenue as well as the income of the local fund for the six months ending March, 1911, showed an increase in the aggregate of 938,000 yen as compared with the taxes collected during the corresponding period of the previous year.

Whatever the present pace in the work of amalgamation may be, there is, however, an element of history to be reckoned with. For, the long period of separate historical development has differentiated the characteristics, temperament, traditions and customs of two peoples. Moreover, centuries of misrule in Korea have created a great gulf between the intellectual and moral qualities of Koreans and Japanese. It is, therefore, only through the agencies of time and history that the two peoples can be completely amalgamated. "In view of certain differences existing in the manners and customs of both peoples," says Mr. Komatsu, chief of the bureau for foreign affairs in Chosen, "it would be inexpedient

to transplant to Chosen *en bloc* the legislative and administrative institutions in vogue in Japan proper." The legislative and judicial systems adopted in Chosen are, consequently, modelled after those in operation in Formosa. While all the ordinary rights and privileges of Japanese citizens are accorded to Koreans, they are denied the enjoyment of certain constitutional and legal rights, as, for instance, the eligibility for the franchise, and the privilege of serving as soldiers.

With the exception of the task of assimilation, which was made possible by annexation, other essential points of the policy adopted by the government general are either the enlargement of the work begun under the residency general or its completion. As these points have already been explained and exemplified, they need not detain us long. Taking a leaf from the history of other successful colonial endeavors, great importance is attached to the development of the means of communication and transportation. For these purposes the diet in the session of 1910 passed a measure for raising a public loan amounting to 56,000,000 yen. Of this loan 10,000,000 is to be devoted to the improvement of highways, while 37,000,000 is to be used for the construction of 174 miles of the Honan Railway, and 136 miles of the Seoul-Wonsan Railway, both to be completed within six years. The Seoul-Fusan and the Seoul-New Wiji Railways are also undergoing improvement in order to perfect the connecting service with the South Manchurian Railway. A plan for the improvement of Fusan, Chemulpo, and Chinnampo harbors has also been drawn up, at an estimated cost of 8,270,000 yen. At the same time postal, telegraphic, and telephone services are being steadily improved.

As to the educational policy, the governor general, in a speech delivered before the meeting of the Chosen provincial governors on July 1, 1911, said:

The guiding principle ought hereafter to be fixed upon the motto that through the cultivation of useful knowledge and a healthy morality should the Koreans be equipped with the capacity and character to become worthy of being subjects of the emperor of Japan. In conformity with that principle the machinery

for primary education should first of all be completed, and at the same time prominence given to industrial education, and finally provisions made for professional education so that one and all might have a respectable career.

The government general of Chosen has for some time been a target for the severe criticisms of the Japanese press for its repression of the public voice in Korea. Not only have the native papers often been suspended for the criticisms they ventured upon the government, but even some of the Japanese papers have been frequently prohibited by the press censor to enter the ports of Korea. There was doubtless good cause for the rigid enforcement of the press regulations at the time of annexation, when the preservation of order and peace was of prime necessity; but it is at least open to doubt whether the continuation of such a repressive measure for any length of time after the annexation, when quiet reigned in the land, was justifiable. The governor general himself has assured the world in many of his utterances that "the spirit of peace and acquiescence pervades the entire length and breadth of the peninsula." It is to be sincerely wished that the government general of Chosen will not turn its back upon the enlightened and liberal policy of Prince Ito, who, thoroughly conversant with the current of thought of the world, and always ready to pay due respect to its opinion, had secured its confidence and good wishes.

The annexation of Korea has imposed upon the Japanese treasury an extraordinary outlay of 30,000,000 yen, beside the need of supplying the annual deficit of the Korean exchequer. The Chosen budget for 1910-1911 totalled 48,740,000 yen in addition to about 7,830,000 yen for army expenditure, and 860,000 yen for navy expenditure, altogether aggregating to 57,420,000 yen. Moreover, 56,000,000 yen are to be spent as already stated for the undertaking of public enterprises in Chosen. These burdens are not light upon the Japanese nation. The cost is, however, small when we consider that the annexation has forever solved the Korean problem and, by eliminating a fruitful source of disturbance from the Far East, one more step has

been taken to ensure lasting peace in the Orient. There are those who may be inclined to doubt the wisdom of Japan in abandoning her invulnerable insular position, and entering upon the career of a continental power with all the consequent dangers and burdens, but for Japan there was no other alternative. She had to face her new responsibilities and face them with firm determination. The future of the new continental power depends upon the energy, the patriotism, and the integrity of the two peoples now forever united.